

EXCISE

Approved in S  
5/15/52

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May 6, 1962

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TO THE  
JOINT-CHIEFS OF STAFF

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY  
Athens, Greece, May 4-5, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Date: May 3, 1962

Time: 0800

Place: Washington

Participants:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/ALT

United States

The Secretary of State  
Mr. Kohler  
Ambassador Ambassador  
Mr. Miller

France

Foreign Minister  
Comte de Larville  
Mr. Laroche  
Mr. Gillet  
Mr. Fournier

United Kingdom

Foreign Secretary  
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh  
Mr. Bernard Ledge  
Mr. Ian Samuel

Germany

Foreign Minister  
Mr. Carstensen  
Mr. von Hass  
Mr. Peinknecht

Subject: Berlin

Copies to: S/S

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JUN 12 1962

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In an introductory statement the Secretary gave his personal impressions of his three meetings with Dobrynin and the preceding Geneva talks. He said that no progress had been made on points of substantial interest to the West. While broader questions, such as nuclear nonproliferation, nonaggression and joint commissions, were mentioned from time to time, they were not pursued by either side. It is possible tentatively to conclude that, while the Soviets are not withdrawing their Berlin proposals, they recognize that our opposing views are clear and direct and nevertheless want no crisis or

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break-off

M. J. Hellenbrand:all

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## PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

break-off of talks. We have throughout stressed that our presence in Berlin is not negotiable, and the Soviets recognize that this is a major issue. The Secretary said that the Soviets have given no indication that they are prepared to acknowledge our vital interests in the situation. The talks, therefore, has not gotten anywhere. This was apparently of no concern to the Soviets. It is interesting to note, the Secretary continued, that the earlier meetings in Geneva were arranged on US initiative. The last four meetings ( three at the experts' level and one between the Secretary and Gromyko) were arranged at Soviet initiative. In his remark to the press after the last meeting, after it had been noted that matters of mutual concern had been discussed, Gromyko added "and these talks will continue".

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The Secretary referred to the fact that Rome and he had talked sharply to Gromyko at Geneva regarding harassment in the air corridors, and noted that shortly after the Foreign Ministers left Geneva they had ceased.

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The Secretary said he wanted it to be understood that we have had no Soviet formal proposals with specific language on the so-called "broader issues". Discussion of these subjects has been minimal compared to the time spent on West Berlin and access thereto. The Soviets still maintain we must get out of West Berlin and, therefore, it is not possible to say that a basis for negotiations exists. Both sides have been reiterating their well-known positions.

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The Secretary observed that perhaps Khrushchev thought the West situation would in any event deteriorate during the interim. Schroeder said that the Soviets might think that this deterioration could be prevented if they waited, but that they were also aware that the West could take action to prevent this. Hence they could not count on it. He

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## PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

The Secretary commented that he was not sure the Soviets expected very much in the direction of East German recognition. He recalled that, when Ambassador Thompson said to Gromyko that we were not going to concede either de jure or de facto recognition to the GDR, Gromyko said that we had already recognized the GDR. If all he has in mind is that we should accept existence of the GDR, this would not be without significance. In various talks the Soviets have not pressed for recognition of the GDR but have emphasized "respect for the sovereignty of GDR" in the access field. We might use the formula as Thompson had following instructions, that we have no intention of interfering with the existence of the GDR and we are not prepared to admit that the GDR should interfere with Berlin access. At Geneva Gromyko came close to saying that prior acceptance by the East Germans of access arrangements would take care of "respect for GDR sovereignty" but this is still admittedly not clear.

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Soviets were moving towards some sort of modus vivendi which would enable them to return to broader questions, but he did not believe they could postpone their peace treaty indefinitely. Since they knew that a separate peace treaty with the Federal Republic was out of the question, they wanted to achieve the effects of such a treaty relative to nuclear weapons, boundaries, etc., without actually having it. They likewise knew that they could at best achieve only partially their Berlin goal of a free city.

Hence their present tactic was to think in terms of an eventual modus vivendi, hoping that present Western positions could be watered down.

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In response to Home's query as to how we saw the next few weeks developing, and whether we felt it necessary to put a further paper to Dobrynin, the Secretary said we were relatively relaxed as to timing. When he returned to Washington we might wait a few days to see if Dobrynin took the initiative. We are in no hurry but want to protect ourselves against any charge of procrastination. In his last talk with Dobrynin he had gotten the impression that the Soviets were getting more rather than less interested in the idea of a modus vivendi. Dobrynin had showed interest in our analysis of Soviet-US exchanges as taking place on three levels. The Secretary then outlined for the Ministers the rationale of our approach, stressing that the "principles paper" was intended to handle the fact of

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disagreement, but this was not, therefore, an attempt to state points of disagreement but rather points of agreement. In response to Schroeder's and Home's questions, the Secretary said we were inclined to put in a redraft of the "principles paper", taking account of the comments of our colleagues, in order to test Soviet reactions, but this was something we wanted to discuss with the other three.

The Secretary noted that an important objective of the paper was to provide a continuing forum for discussion of outstanding problems. This raised the possibility of an Austrian-type negotiation going on for years which would not require formal withdrawal of unacceptable Soviet proposals but at the same time would not require them to do anything about them. One possibility, the Secretary said, was that the Soviets have decided that they are in a relatively weak military situation, especially in the nuclear field, and are aware that we have discovered this. They may have embarked on a crash nuclear and missile rearmament program and may want a deliberate postponement on Berlin pending improvement of their military position. Schroeder commented that the idea of an indefinite Four-Power forum is not a bad one for the Germans but they wondered about the jurisdictional problem. Such a forum was appropriate for discussion of German and Berlin questions but not so appropriate for discussion of broader questions such as nuclear nonproliferation and non-aggression pacts. However, he felt a solution to this jurisdictional problem could be found once the Four Power forum was in existence. The Secretary said we were aware of the danger of amassing the Berlin problem with other issues and we did not wish to establish the idea that our presence in West Berlin was contingent upon these other questions. At some stage it might be desirable that the subject of nuclear nonproliferation be taken up in the disarmament context, but for the moment we thought its inclusion in Berlin talks might be useful. Home commented he did not think we could keep the discussion of this subject out of the disarmament context much longer. The Secretary agreed, noting we have held back its discussion in the 16-Power context because we thought it might be useful in the Berlin context. Gromyko had said that the Soviets wanted the non-proliferation commitment applied specifically to Germany. For our part we were, of course, not interested in Germany but in Red China, and therefore wanted a more general formulation. Schroeder noted that perhaps one reason Gromyko had not placed so much stress on nonproliferation in his talks with the Secretary was that the Soviets believed the Geneva forum, with neutrals present, was a more favorable one. If they obtained a Berlin solution they could always tie the Geneva and Berlin settlements together, viewing the former as an "ersatz" for the peace treaty.

Home asked how the Secretary thought "living with disagreement" could work out. Couve said we had been doing this for seventeen years. The Secretary commented that "living with disagreement" necessarily involved

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some procedural understanding. With this in mind, we have attempted to provide some formal instrument of consultation such as the Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies. It also involved some limitation on any peace treaty the Soviets might sign with the East Germans. If they should attempt to carry out the threatened implications of such a treaty, as we have warned them constantly, this would lead to a serious crisis.

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The Ministers then turned to the handling of the Berlin question in the NATO Ministerial Session of May 4. It was agreed that the Secretary would not attempt to report for the Four but merely on his own behalf, and that each of the other Ministers would feel free to make his own comments if he felt it desirable to do so. All likewise agreed that every effort should be made to avoid a lengthy wrangle over Berlin section of the communique similar to that which occurred in Paris during the December Ministerial Meeting.

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MJHillenbrand:all  
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